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Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) pose new challenges to verification and validation that go beyond the
proof of functional correctness based on high-level models. Particular challenges are, in particular
for formal methods, its heterogeneity and scalability. For numerical simulation, uncertain behavior
can hardly be covered in a comprehensive way which motivates the use of symbolic methods.
The paper describes an approach for symbolic simulation-based verification of CPS with uncer-
tainties. We define a symbolic model and representation of uncertain computations: Affine Arith-
metic Decision Diagrams. Then we integrate this approach in the SystemC AMS simulator that
supports simulation in different models of computation. We demonstrate the approach by analyzing
a water-level monitor with uncertainties, self-diagnosis, and error-reactions.
1 Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) consist of a large number of networked, co-operating and open sub-sys-
tems [20]. This is a blessing and a curse: On one hand, the high number of components and their
open nature make it likely that some components fail, are changed, or get inaccurate sensor data. On
the other hand, co-operation allows us to implement resilience that maintains dependable operation. As
CPS often implement mission-critical ecosystems and services, e.g. autonomous driving, or aviation,
it is mandatory to show that errors and deviations must not lead to a failure or to an unsafe state (fail
safe). Even more: in CPS, the correct function shall be maintained under presence of uncertainties (fail
operational). However, in CPS, the terms “error” and “correctness” require a new understanding.
The first reason for this is that faults, unforeseen changes, and deviations have to be considered as
likely part of normal behavior. Therefore, we summarize all kinds of such events that cause deviations
from the ideal behavior under the more general term uncertainty. Due to its higher probability, the prop-
agation and interaction of multiple uncertainties of different kinds must be verified thoroughly. However,
the complexity of dynamic behavior, and interactions of multiple uncertainties across different domains
are often too complex to be handled by simulation or human imagination. It requires exhaustive methods
such as symbolic simulation or model checking.
The second reason is that CPS are deployed in a more open environment than embedded systems. In
consequence, correctness in the sense of fulfilling specified properties that stem from design-time analy-
sis of well-defined use-cases might be too simple. CPS also have to cope with changing requirements or
unforeseen scenarios. This demands for the application of adaptive methods.
This paper pursues the following objectives: First, we describe how formal verification and symbolic
simulation can contribute in an heterogeneous, industrial verification process for CPS. Second, we study
the propagation and interaction of uncertainties in some models of computation (MoC) as a starting point
for future work that shall provide a basis for the symbolic simulation in arbitrary combinations of differ-
ent MoC. Implementation and examples can be downloaded from http://cps.cs.uni-kl.de/AADD.
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1.1 Related work and contribution
For the understanding of interacting discrete and continuous subsystems of CPS with uncertain behavior,
research on verification of hybrid systems provides valuable insights. In the continuous domain, the –
due to propagation of uncertainties modeled by non-deterministic behavior – reachable state space is seg-
mented by planes into convex geometric figures. Zonotopes [11, 2] and support functions [18] improve
scalability in non-linear systems. Also, affine arithmetic [10] is used in particular in the verification of
analog circuits and systems [12]. Its geometrical interpretation is similar to a zonotope, but it offers
further useful properties; they in particular maintain correlation information. In order to yield high scal-
ability also for discrete systems, functionally reduced AND-Inverter graphs are combined with models
of linear continuous dynamics [8].
For the discrete subsystem, this work is very similar to methods for symbolic execution of software,
where control-flow introduces path conditions as discrete states. To cope with the path explosion problem
SAT and/or SMT solvers (e.g. [4, 16]) are used to determine the reachable paths. Affine arithmetic has
been used in this context for the static analysis of rounding errors in DSP algorithms [9] or numerical
programs and even hybrid systems in [22] based on splitting affine arithmetic forms (AAF) and joining
them in an enclosing hull, in particular targeting stability and robustness.
For CPS, its networked, distributed, and heterogeneous nature poses additional challenges [20]. This
includes in particular the use of domain-specific modeling formalisms in different parts of a CPS. In this
context, the term models of computation also became popular in the domain of modeling/simulation. Lee
and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli [19] introduced a meta-model in which different models of computation and
different means for communication and synchronization can be uniformly represented and compared. A
mostly similar, but more refined approach is proposed by Jantsch in [14, 15].
This paper contributes two main results: First, we introduce an efficient yet simple method to com-
pute with uncertain values that combines affine arithmetic with binary decision diagrams: Affine Arith-
metic Decision Diagrams (AADD; Sec. 3). Second, we deliberately distinguish between symbolic com-
putation with uncertain values and concrete models of computation (Sec. 4). This allows us to model CPS
in a variety of models of computation without being limited to a specific one such as hybrid automata.
We demonstrate the approach by an example (Sec. 5).
2 Verification of uncertain CPS
For software and digital systems, the underlying digital synchronous hardware platforms allow us to
abstract from all physical variations in e.g. temperature, supply voltage, and to focus on the ‘ideal’,
intended behavior of algorithms. Hence, inside this domain we can easily specify properties, prove its
correctness, and trust the results. This does not hold once physical domains or human interactions are
involved, e.g. an autonomously driving vehicle in a city. Therefore, for verification of CPS we have
to very carefully re-think basic assumptions, methodologies, and strip down verification to different,
well-defined verification problems.
A particular challenge for verification of CPS in this context is the presence of uncertainty. Uncer-
tainty can be defined as “any deviation from the unachievable ideal of completely deterministic knowl-
edge of the relevant system” [26]. Formally, uncertainty can be modeled by non-deterministic or proba-
bilistic choice of a value from a set or range. As uncertainties, we treat in particular unknown deviations
due to modeling or implementation issues, variations in physical implementations, abstractions in mod-
els, faults, or errors. Furthermore, uncertainties can also come from the environment of CPS (external
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uncertainties). External uncertainties can be operating parameters such as the temperature or humidity,
but also inputs that are uncertain, e.g. jitter in clocks, but also unforeseen use case scenarios.
Systems	engineering:
Requirements,	properties,	specification,	use-case	scenarios
Reliability	engineering	identifies
- Faults	&	errors
- Deviations,	inaccuracies
- Inaccurate	models
- Abstractions
- (Hazards	&	Risks)
- ...
System	design:	designs
- Architecture block	diagram		
- Executable	models
- Self-diagnosis
- Error	reactions
- Refinement	of	interfaces
- ...
Verification	of
uncertain	CPS
Figure 1: Overview of the development- and verification methodology.
For the verification of uncertainties in CPS we assume a development process as shown in Fig. 1:
Systems engineering formulates, more or less formal, required properties, use case scenarios, and maybe
a functional model. Verification objective is, at this stage, to show that the functional model fulfills the
required properties and is free of inherent problems.
The following system development consists at least of system design and reliability engineering.
System design refines the functional model to an architecture level block diagram, and reliability en-
gineering. Reliability engineering identifies risks, hazards and initiating faults and deviations. Then
it is investigated whether initiating faults or deviations can become an error or a hazard. If this is the
case, methods for the self-diagnosis and error reactions are implemented. Objective of the verification of
uncertain CPS is to support these tasks.
We make the following basic assumptions for verification of uncertain CPS:
• The system design is specified in a domain-specific language in the form of a block diagram.
• The components have parameters that model arbitrary kind of uncertainties such as the potential
presence of continuous deviations or discrete faults.
• The inputs can have parameters that model external uncertainties.
The objective of verification of uncertain CPS is to show that for arbitrary chosen uncertain values the
properties of the design are within its specified ranges. Our approach can be considered as a bounded-
time symbolic simulation with assertion checking [24].
Obviously, verification of uncertain CPS does not show its general correctness. It must be comple-
mented with other approaches that focus specifically, e.g. on concurrency issues. We deliberately limit
our approach to one task to yield better scalability. In the following, we first formalize the representation
of uncertainties and its propagation in computations, and then in different models of computations.
3 Uncertainties in computations
In the following, we first formalize the representation of uncertainties in symbolic computations. In-
formally, we represent uncertain values, short uncertainties, as quantities (e.g. x˜, xˆ, xˇ) that depend from
uncertain variables εi,χi. We consider these variables as the atomic, basic sources of uncertainty.
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Definition 3.1 (Basic uncertainties) A discrete basic uncertainty is a variable χi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ⊂ N
which takes values in the set B = {true, f alse}. Let X = {χ1, . . . ,χm} be the set of all basic discrete
uncertainties. A continuous basic uncertainty is a variable ε j, j ∈ {1, . . .n} ⊂ N which takes values
in [−1,1] ⊆ R. Let E = {ε1, . . . ,εn} be the set of all basic continuous uncertainties. m and n can be
increased.
3.1 Propagated continuous and discrete uncertainties
Definition 3.2 (Continuous propagated uncertainty) A continuous propagated uncertainty x˜ is a quan-
tity x˜ : E→ R that describes the dependency of the real-valued result of a computation from the basic
continuous uncertainties E.
We represent continuous propagated uncertainties by affine arithmetic forms (AAF, [10]):
x˜ = x0+
n
∑
i=1
xiεi with εi ∈ [−1,1],x0 ∈ R,xi ∈ R (1)
where each xi models the sensitivity of x˜ to the basic uncertainty εi (1st order effects). Let range(x˜) of an
AAF x˜ be an interval [lb,ub]⊆ R with:
range(x˜) = [x0−
n
∑
i=1
xi, x0+
n
∑
i=1
xi] (2)
The linear operations (+,−, ·) where · corresponds to multiplication with a constant c ∈R on AAF are:
c(x˜± y˜) = c(x0± y0)+
n
∑
i=1
c(xi± yi)εi (3)
Non-linear operations z˜ = f (x˜, y˜) are handled by a linear inclusion and increase n by 1. For this purpose
f (x˜, y˜) is over-approximated by an affine form f a(x˜, y˜) = z0+∑ni=1 ziεi and an additional term zn+1εn+1:
f (x˜, y˜)⊆ f a(x˜, y˜)+ zn+1εn+1 (4)
The computation of f a(x˜, y˜) and zn+1 is a multi-criteria optimization problem that is solved by approxi-
mation schemes that make different trade-offs, e.g [10]:
• Minimal range approximation – The minimal range approximation eliminates over-approximation
at interval bounds (Min: range( f (x˜, y˜))) at the cost of an increasing zn+1.
• Chebychev approximation – The Chebychev approximation minimizes zn+1 at the cost of increas-
ing the range of f a(x˜, y˜).
As each non-linear operation increases n by one, the number of variables grows linear with the number
of nonlinear operations. To avoid this, we use only a single additional variable ε to which we add all
approximation errors by assuming them as uncorrelated. This also guarantees safe inclusion.
Example As example consider two AAF a˜= 1+2ε1, b˜= 2−2ε1+ε2. Then a˜+ b˜= 3+ε2, and a ·b=
2+2ε1+ ε2+[−6,2] where [−6,2] ensures safe inclusion; to come to an AAF with a ε3x3 including the
non-linear terms, we can either increase [−6,2] to [−6,6](x3 = 6), or increase x1 and 2 while reducing x3.
Note, that the geometrical interpretation of an AAF is equivalent to two zonotopes: one including
xn+1εn+1 that gives the enclosing hull (over-approximation), and another one without xn+1εn+1 that gives
the inner hull (under-approximation).
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Definition 3.3 (Discrete propagated uncertainty) A discrete propagated uncertainty xˇ is a Boolean
function xˇ : X→ B that describes the dependency of the ideal result of a computation from the basic
discrete uncertainties X.
For example, discrete propagated uncertainties can describe the possible results of a Boolean function
in the potential presence of discrete faults (i.e. the χi). As discrete propagated uncertainties are boolean
functions, we represent them by (if needed reduced) ordered binary decision diagrams (ROBDD [7]). We
assume the reader is familiar with ROBDD. In brief, a BDD is a DAG (V,E) whose terminal vertices are
labeled true or f alse, and whose internal vertices v ∈ V are labeled with the variables xi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
of a boolean function y = f (x1, . . . ,xn) and are connected with a vertex vt = true(v) and v f = f alse(v),
depending of the value of a variable xi. If the order of its variables xi is the same on all paths, it is ordered
(OBDD). If all redundancies in form of isomorphisms and double-edges are removed, it is reduced
(ROBDD).
3.2 Hybrid uncertainties
Computations consist of both discrete and continuous parts. This is the case for algorithms where com-
putations on real numbers are controlled by a discrete control flow, i.e. conditional statements and
iterations. In the following we extend the definitions of uncertainties towards ‘hybrid uncertainties’.
Definition 3.4 (Hybrid uncertainty) A hybrid uncertainty xˆ is a quantity xˆ : X×E→ R∪B that de-
scribes the dependency of a real-valued or boolean result of a computation from the discrete and contin-
uous basic uncertainties X,E.
We structure computations as shown by Fig. 2 into a discrete and a continuous part. The parts interact
via comparisons of continuous variables that can be uncertain (‘uncertain conditions’, later defined as
Xc), and via branches in the continuous part that can be uncertain. We consider uncertain conditions and
uncertain branches as basic uncertainties for the discrete and continuous parts.
uncertain	conditions 𝕏"
continuous part,
e.g.	computations
Ω
𝜀
discrete part,
e.g.	control flow
basic uncertainties
uncertain	branches
𝕏 𝔼(known	inputs) (known	inputs)
ideal	results	+	f(basic	uncertainties)
Figure 2: Interactions between discrete and continuous part in a computation.
However, the uncertainty in the interaction between discrete and continuous parts must be consid-
ered when computing the uncertainty of the overall computation (‘hybrid uncertainties’). [22] handles
uncertain branches by merging all paths into a single, convex region. However, this introduces over-
approximation that we strive to avoid. To come to more accurate bounds, we use the information on the
interaction between the discrete and the continuous part.
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Example For example, consider b = 3+ ε1 and the computation if(b>3) b+=10; else b-=10;.
Then, we cannot evaluate b > 3 to either true or f alse. A safe inclusion of the result would be 3+ ε1+
10ε2; however, with over-approximation. A more accurate representation is:
(13+ ε1 | (ε1 > 0))∨ (−7+ ε1 | (ε1 ≤ 0))
The above representation is a Shannon expansion. This motivates the following representation based on
ordered binary decision diagrams.
3.3 Affine Arithmetic Decision Diagrams
We represent hybrid uncertainties by affine arithmetic decision diagrams (AADD). The idea of AADD
is shown in Fig. 3. We use OBDD to represent the selection of an AAF by the discrete uncertainties
X∪Xc. The OBDD can be reduced, if needed, to an ROBDD; however, we do not need it as a canonical
representation. We label its leaf vertices with AAF in case we have an uncertain real-valued result, or
with true resp. f alse if the function has a boolean result.
Leaf nodes:	AAF|0|1
ROBDD
𝕏 ∪ 𝕏#𝔼
(select	path	in	ROBDD)
Figure 3: Overview of AADD and how they model hybrid uncertainties.
Definition 3.5 (Uncertain condition) An uncertain condition is χc be a predicate whose variables are
from E∪X. Let Xc be the set of all uncertain conditions.
For convenience, we do not distinguish between basic discrete uncertainties X and uncertain conditions
Xc and abbreviate X∪Xc = XG = {χ1 . . .χo} (general discrete uncertainties).
Definition 3.6 (AADD) An AADD is a directed acyclic graph AADD = (Q,T,E1,E0,XG) with internal
vertices Q, terminal vertices T , edges E1∪E0, discrete uncertainties XG, and it holds:
• Internal vertices v ∈ Q have two leaving edges true(v) ∈ E1 and f alse(v) ∈ E0, and are labeled
with index(v) = i; each i corresponds to an χi ∈ XG.
• AADD are ordered: index(v1)< index(v2) for all edges (v1,v2) from v1 ∈ Q to v2 ∈ Q∪T .
• Terminal vertices v ∈ T are labeled with value(v) ∈ B for a boolean-valued hybrid uncertainty, or
an AAF (Eq. 1) for a continuous-valued hybrid uncertainty.
An AADD with root r ∈ Q∪T represents a hybrid uncertainty xˆ = f (v); f (v) is defined recursively:
• For v ∈ T : f (v) = value(v),
• For v ∈ Q: f (v) = χindex(v) f (true(v))∨χ index(v) f ( f alse(v)) for χindex(v) ∈ XG
In the following we define arithmetic, logical and relational operations on AADD.
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Definition 3.7 (Arithmetic and binary logical operations) Let xˆ, yˆ be an AADD with root vertices vx,vy.
Operations xˆ
⊙
yˆ with
⊙
: AADD×AADD→ AADD are defined recursively:
1. For vx,vy ∈ T , the operations result in an AADD that is a terminal vertex v labeled value(v) =
value(vx)
⊙
value(vy). For value(vx),value(vy) of type AAF (Eq. 1),
⊙
is given by Eq. 3,4. For
value(vx),value(vy) ∈ B, the operation⊙ are boolean functions.
2. For vx ∈ T,vy ∈ Q the result is an AADD with root v and index(v) = index(vy), f alse(v) =
vx
⊙
f alse(vy) and true(v) = vx
⊙
true(vy).
3. For vx,vy ∈ Q the result is an AADD with root v and
• For index(vx) = index(vy):
index(v) = index(vx), f alse(v) = f alse(vx)
⊙
f alse(vy), true(v) = true(vx)
⊙
true(vy).
• For index(vx)< index(vy):
index(v) = index(vx), f alse(v) = f alse(vx)
⊙
vy, true(v) = true(vx)
⊙
vy.
• For index(vx)> index(vy):
index(v) = index(vy), f alse(v) = vx
⊙
f alse(vy), true(v) = vx
⊙
true(vy).
In the following we define relational operations. We define the comparison of an AADD as with 0 as
the right operand. Comparisons of two AADD can be transformed into this representation by subtracting
the right side of the relational operator.
Definition 3.8 (Relations) Let xˆ be an AADD with root vx. Then, the inequality operation xˆ 0 with
 ∈<,>,==,≤,≥ and  : AADD×{0}→ AADD, is defined recursively as:
1. For vx ∈ T the result is an AADD that consists of one vertex vz.
• For 0 /∈ range(value(vx)), the result vz is a terminal vertex with value(vz) defined by Table 1.
• For 0 ∈ range(value(vx)), the result vz is an internal vertex. χm+1 = value(vx)0 is added
to XG, and index(vz) = m+1, f alse(vz) = 0, and true(vz) = 1.
2. For vx ∈ Q the result is an AADD with root vz and index(vz) = index(vx), f alse(vz) = f alse(vx)
and true(vz) = true(vx).
Table 1: Relational operators.
value(vx)< 0
value(vz) = 1 : ub(value(vx))< 0
value(vz) = 0 : lb(value(vx))≥ 0
vz : otherwise
value(vx)≤ 0
value(vz) = 1 : ub(value(vx))≤ 0
value(vz) = 0 : lb(value(vx))> 0
vz : otherwise
value(vx)> 0
value(vz) = 1 : lb(value(vx))> 0
value(vz) = 0 : ub(value(vx))≤ 0
vz : otherwise
value(vx)≥ 0
value(vz) = 1 : lb(value(vx))≥ 0
value(vz) = 0 : ub(value(vx))> 0
vz : otherwise
value(vx) == 0
value(vz) = 1 : value(vx) == 0
value(vz) = 0 : (ub(value(vx))< 0)∨ (lb(value(vx))> 0)
vz : otherwise
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The definition of the inequality operation 6=: AADD×AADD→ R is straight forward since it holds that
(xˆ 6= 0) = ¬(xˆ == 0).
The AAF at the terminal nodes are representing the correlations correctly, but over-approximate
the range. Accurate bounds are required for the evaluation of relational operators according to Tab. 1.
The over-approximation is mostly due the uncertain conditions that impose additional constraints. To
compute the exact range of xˆ in a terminal node vx ∈ T with value x˜ we set up a system of inequations
(for all indices k of the nodes along the path to vx):
lb(x˜),ub(x˜) subject to the uncertain conditions for all internal vertexes along the path to vx (5)
In the concrete implementation of AADD, this is the LP problem that is solved using GLPK LP
solver.
Example In Fig. 4 we show a
computation with uncertain values
AAF a(0,2), b. The representa-
tion by AAF is shown to the right
of the C++ code. The statements in
the conditional statement introduce
conditions; the AADD for b after the
conditional statement is shown at the
right hand side of the figure.
#include <AADD.h>
void example()
{                 // Trace of b:
AAF a(0,2), b;  // b=0
b = a+2;        // b=3+ 𝜀"
if (b>3) b+=10; // b>3:  b=13+ 𝜀"
else b -= 10;   // b<=3: b=-7+ 𝜀"
b = b*2;        // no merge=>AADD
}
3+ 𝜀">3
-7+ 𝜀" 13+ 𝜀"
(true)(false)
Figure 4: Example for an AADD.
4 Uncertainties in Models of Computation
So far, we have neglected communication and synchronization and focused on the pure computational
kernel of processes. In this section we study the impact of uncertainties on synchronization and process
execution mechanisms that define Models of Computations (MoCs).
4.1 Processes and signals
Lee and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli introduced the tagged signal model [19] as a meta-model based on
which the interaction of models of computation such as dataflow, discrete and continuous timed and or
synchronous languages can be modeled. A tag is drawn from a set T that models time and that may
be a partially ordered set (untimed models), the integers (timed models), or the set of real numbers
(continuous timed models). Hence, MoCs are distinguished only by the structure of signals and, to some
extent, by the execution mechanics of processes.
In the following we briefly describe the model from [14, 15] which is equivalent to the tagged signal
model but represents time implicitly by the order of events rather than by explicit time stamps. Processes
communicate with each other by writing to and reading from signals. Given is a set of values V, which
represents the data communicated over the signals. V may be a discrete set or a continuous set. Events
are the basic elements of signals; they consist of values and time tags. In the special case of untimed
signals, the tags may be omitted and ordering of events is determined by the ordering within a signal. We
distinguish between three different kinds of events.
Untimed events E˙ are just values without further time information beyojnd the ordering within the
signal, E˙ = V . Discrete timed events Eˆ include a pseudo value ⊥ in addition to the normal values,
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hence E¯ =V ∪{⊥}. Continuous timed events E˜ use the real numbers as time tags and thus, they can be
considered as a (v, t) pair with v ∈V, t ∈ R.
We use E = E˙ ∪ Eˆ ∪ E˜ and e ∈ E to denote any kind of event.
Signals are sequences of events. Sequences are ordered and we use subscripts as in ei to denote the
ith event in a signal. E.g. a signal may be written as 〈e0,e1,e2〉. In general signals can be finite or infinite
sequences of events and S is the set of all signals. We also distinguish between three kinds of signals
and S˙, Sˆ and S˜ denote the untimed, discrete timed and continuous timed signal sets, respectively, and s˙,
sˆ and s˜ designate individual untimed, discrete timed, and continuous timed signals. A particular type of
signal is used in the corresponding Model of Computation, e.g. an untimed MoC contains only untimed
signals.
Processes are defined as functions on signals
p : S→ S,
which means process p consumes the events on its input signal and produces the events on its output
signal. Since a process is a function, it is deterministic and will produce always the same output signal
for a given input signal. They may have internal state, which means that the generated event at the
output depends on the input event and the internal state of the process at that time. A process network is
constructed by connecting processes via their input and output signals.
4.2 Models of Computation
Now we are in a position to define several Models of Computation (MoC) that are popular in hardware,
software or embedded systems design. A MoC determines execution mechanics that activates a process
based on specific conditions, e.g. availability of inputs.
Definition 4.1 (Untimed MoC) An untimed MoC is the set of all process networks where all processes
communicate with each other with untimed signals s˙ ∈ S˙ only.
Processes can be executed once all inputs are available. Outputs can be written depending on values
computed by processes. An example is the Kahn Process Networks (KPN) MoC [17].
Definition 4.2 (Static Dataflow) Static Dataflow is an untimed MoC where each process consumes and
produces always the same number of events in each evaluation cycle.
Different processes may consume and produce different number of events. In the literature this static
dataflow is often also called synchronous dataflow. Process execution is done in a static schedule that
can be computed before execution.
Definition 4.3 (Discrete Time MoC) Discrete Time MoC is the set of all process networks where all
processes communicate with each other with timed signals sˆ ∈ Sˆ.
Processes can be activated by arbitrary conditions of time, inputs, or internal states. Examples for discrete
time MoC are the discrete-event simulation semantics of VHDL or SystemC.
Definition 4.4 (Continuous Time MoC) Continuous time MoC describes processes by differential and
algebraic equations (DAE). Signals are continuous timed signals s˜ ∈ S˜ that represent the solutions of the
DAEs.
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In the continuous-time MoC, the process execution is controlled by a ‘solver’. The solver can select
discrete time steps in order to approximate the ideal, continuous time signals while minimizing the error
due to discretization. Values of events for arbitrary times can be computed by interpolation if needed.
Note, that the set V of values transported by signals and processed by processes is irrelevant for
the definition of MoCs. V may be an arbitrary set, binary, discrete, continuous, structured, etc. This
obliviousness allows us to extend these MoCs to values with uncertainties. However, uncertain values
might have impact on the concrete behavior of models in different MoCs.
4.3 Uncertain values and their impact on MoCs
In the case of uncertain values, the set V becomes a set of continuous, discontinuous, or hybrid (propa-
gated) uncertainties. Then, the computation of the function p that defines the behavior of processes can
be computed and represented as described in Sec. 3. However, as conditions on values can trigger the
execution of processes, we have to study the impact of uncertain values. For this purpose we distinguish
static and dynamic MoC activation:
Definition 4.5 (Static/Dynamic MoC) MoC are called static if the order of all events and their times
are independent from the values of the computations. MoCs that are not static are dynamic.
Static dataflow is a static MoC: by definition 4.2, a constant number of events is produced and
consumed at each process activation.
The continuous time MoC can also be considered as a static MoC. In continuous time MoC, there are
events for every time drawn from R; we consider the way how they are computed as an implementation
detail.
Untimed MoC and discrete timed MoC are dynamic MoC, if they are not further restricted. As proof
we give one example of a process (in pseudo-code) that shows it is not static:
if(condition_on_value) // can be uncertain
write(signal_event_that_activates_process );
else
do_nothing;
Nevertheless, many models and implementations in these MoC can be considered as static if they
avoid activation of processes depending on conditions on values.
If we have static MoCs or models that can fulfill the requirements for a static MoC, we can do
symbolic simulation by replacing the set of values V with symbolic representations such as AADD.
Static MoCs (or static models) pave the path for a very easy implementation in design and modeling
languages that support abstract data types and operator overloading; examples for such languages are
C++, VHDL, SystemC. Then, we can replace pre-defined data types with an AADD-based data type and
leave the symbolic simulation to overloaded operators.
For dynamic MoC in the general case we have to consider that process execution can become uncer-
tain. This leads to a number of problems that we have not yet completely solved:
• First, a process, at the same time, must be executed and not executed. We can solve this by adding a
symbol unionsq to the set of reachable values represented by an AADD. Then, a process, when executed
can compute outputs also for this case (that is, doing nothing) in addition to the other symbolic
manipulations on AADD; however this is seen as future work.
• A fundamental issue is the interface between continuous-time MoC and other MoC that leads to a
non-computable problem in general. Here, uncertainty of values in conditions leads to an uncertain
time of process activation; to cope with this issue is rather a modeling challenge and can be avoided
in many cases.
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4.4 Turning the SystemC AMS simulator into a symbolic simulator
SystemC AMS ([6, 25], IEEE Std 1666.1-2016) targets the modeling of highly complex mixed dis-
crete/continuous systems with a focus on a high simulation performance. It extends SystemC’s timed
(discrete-event) MoC with support for the static dataflow MoC, and a continuous time MoC. By the in-
teraction of the untimed static dataflow with the timed signals of the other MoCs its samples get timed
semantics; therefore, in [6, 25] we used the term timed dataflow (TDF). SystemC AMS uses TDF as a
coordinating MoC that controls the interactions between different MoC and executes them in constant
time steps. Its processes can be specified by
• C++ code that models e.g. computations of embedded software.
• Transfer functions, linear differential equations, or static nonlinear functions.
• Linear circuits and switches that model sensors and actuators.
To enable industrial application, SystemC AMS provides a framework that that yields predictable behav-
ior and scalability. 1 Predictable behavior means that the behavior of models is intuitive; this is achieved
by using TDF as a coordinating MoC in hierarchical models. For the sake of scalability, SystemC AMS
by default:
• Uses MoC that are scalable and numerically robust: data-flow, and linear continuous-time models.
• Does not compute threshold-crossing of continuous quantities; continuous quantities are sampled.
However, SystemC AMS gives users the choice where, and how to solve problems that are known to lack
scalability. For this purpose, SystemC AMS provides the user with interfaces to allow them to select time
steps in a dynamic way, to compute thresholds accurately, and to add solvers for non-linear differential
equations if needed.
Simulator	(SystemC	AMS)	
&	model	with	uncertainties
Types:	double,	 int,	bool
Operations	on	values
Conditional	 statements,
iteration	statements	
Symbolic	Framework:	AADD
(used	as	Abstract	Data	Type)
AADD	abstract	data	type
Operations	on	AADD
Macros	for	treating	
uncertainties	in	branches
replace	types
overload	
operations
add	instru-
mentations
Figure 5: Overview of implementation based on the SystemC AMS reference simulator.
We extended Coseda’s implementation of the numeric SystemC AMS simulator [1] to a symbolic
simulator. The underlying MoC are static MoC provided the C++ code does not fork additional processes
or uses shared variables. Like the SystemC AMS standard we give the user the choice where to use
symbolic simulation. For this purpose, we provide an abstract data type AADD that provides AADD,
overloaded operations on it, and some macros that support the interactive choice between symbolic and
numeric execution for branches in loops and conditional statements. Figure 5 gives an overview.
1The standardization was clearly industry-driven with focus on scalability. Hybrid automata in contrast, with good reason,
focus on the fundamental issues with a penalty in terms of scalability.
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4.5 Scalability: is symbolic simulation with AADD worth the effort?
The use of AADD imposes some overhead. In the following we discuss the overhead to a single, nu-
merical simulation run and the fidelity of the results, and compare complexity with multi-run simulation
based approaches that strive to yield similar results (Table 2).
Table 2: Scalability and fidelity of numerical vs. AADD-based symbolic simulation.
Multi-run simulation, continuous Symbolic with AADD
MC analysis WC/EVA analysis continuous discrete
Scala- quadratic(confidence), Worst case: > exp. linear (#cont. uncert.) exp. (#disc. uncert.)
bility const(#cont. uncert.) Typical case: linear
Fidelity under-approximation under-approximation over-approximation over-approximation
For numerical simulation-based approaches of continuous systems, Table 2 gives the number of nu-
merical simulation runs that are needed to achieve comparable, yet not comprehensive results by semi-
formal approaches. We compare Monte Carlo analysis (MC), or Worst-Case (WC) analysis by Extreme
Value Analysis (EVA). MC analysis has the advantage that the number of simulation runs does not grow
with the number of uncertainties; it grows quadratically with the desired confidence. WC/EVA analysis
tries to find worst-case corners of properties by checking possible combinations of corners of uncertain-
ties. Various heuristics find under-approximations more efficiently in particular for linear systems, but
it is impossible to get comprehensive results in the general case. For mixed discrete/continuous systems
resp. uncertain CPS, we have to visit each reachable discrete mode and do MC, WC or EVA analysis in
it for comprehensive results.
For AADD-based symbolic simulation the overhead depends on the number of uncertainties. In the
continuous domain, AADD-based symbolic simulation introduces a constant overhead that only grows
with the number of uncertainties; however, over-approximation can be an issue for non-linear systems.
In the discrete domain, we in general have the problem that there is an exponential growth of possible
execution paths (path explosion problem). For AADD, the size (and the run-time) grows with the size of
the (R)OBDD. It can grow exponentially in the worst case with the number of basic discrete uncertainties;
however, it does not in many cases which is a well-known issue in the research on ROBDD.
A problem is that reduction of OBDD to ROBDD costs a lot of time. Therefore, we use OBDD or
even a simple array structure as implementation in [23] that we call XAAF. This is still efficient for some
thousand reached discrete states (leaf nodes of AAF). Scalability using the array-based implementation
is shown by examples of a Σ∆-converter in [23] and a PLL in [5].
5 Analysis of an uncertain water-level monitor with error-reactions
5.1 Modeling the water level monitor in SystemC AMS
We have characterized cyber-physical systems in Sec. 1 by its open and networked nature that, due to
the increased likelihood of deviations or faults, demands for means to compensate such uncertainties.
For demonstration, we extend the water level monitor model from [3] in that direction. The water level
monitor consists of a tank of which the water level falls with a rate of f alling = 2 in./sec. A pump can,
if switched on, add an incoming flow so that in sum the water level increases with a rate of rising = 1
in./sec. Two sensors indicate whether a level of 5 in. (empty) or 10 in. (full) is reached. The water level
must not fall below 1 in. or rise above 12 in.
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Tank Controller
Observer
pump
full
empty
error_mode
Figure 6: The cyber-physical water level monitor with observer and a controller with fail-safe mode.
Compared with the water level monitor from [3], we added in Fig. 6 the following uncertainties:
• Continuous uncertainties in the rates of the water tank: f alling = 2+0.1ε1, rising = 1+0.1ε2.
• A discrete uncertainty: the possibility that the sensor in the tank does not indicate, when 10 in. are
reached as an initiating fault: f ull = χ1.
Obviously, one can find and add more uncertainties. Furthermore, there is a process (Observer), written
in C++, that shall detect the discrete fault and signal the controller to go into a fail-safe error mode. It is
invoked every second and checks whether the pump is on for more than 10 sec. (self-diagnosis) and then
signals via error mode that the controller shall go into a fail-safe state:
void processing () // Activated every 1.0 sec.
{
if (error_mode == false)
{
if (pump==true) {
timer += 1; // We take the time ...
if (timer > 10) error_mode = true;
}
else timer = 0;
}
}
In the fail-safe state, the controller limits the time the pump is on. We specified the water level model
using the TDF MoC of SystemC AMS. The controller process (also written in C++) is activated every
0.1 sec. and samples the water level sensors. The observer process is activated every 1.0 sec.
For symbolic simulation we have to modify the SystemC AMS model, supported by macro defini-
tions. This affects in particular branches in control flow. Here, we have to consider that the result of
a branch condition can be true, f alse, but as well uncertain. In the first two cases, the code remains
unchanged. The third case occurs for comparisons that depend on at least one AADD. Then have to
apply a code instrumentation that adds an uncertain condition; details on the code instrumentations are
described in [23].
5.2 Symbolic simulation of the uncertain water level monitor
Objective of the verification of uncertain CPS is to show that in the presence of the uncertainties (inaccu-
racies, initiating faults), self-diagnosis and error reaction ensure that no unsafe state (here: a level above
15 in.) is reached. For this purpose we used symbolic simulation bounded to 40 sec. time with assertion
checking.
In figure 7 we show the results of symbolic simulation of the water level monitor for the cases with
and without the discrete error. The total time required for one symbolic run of the water level monitor
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Figure 7: Symbolic simulation results (worst case borders plotted) compared with numeric worst case
(by extreme value analysis) analysis results.
without observer is 6.8 sec.; it resulted in an AADD with 387 leaf nodes. The result is shown in Fig. 7a,
left. As it can be seen, the inaccuracies in the rates can lead to an error. The corner-case simulation
results (that my be an under-approximation) are plotted black, the range of the water level is plotted in
blue. For the water-level monitor and the observer, with injecting a deterministic error in a sensor, we get
a run-time of 30 sec. and an AADD with 945 leaf nodes: once the error is detected, the controller goes in
a state in which he limits the on-time of the pump (Fig. 7b, right only shows this case). Note, that due the
interaction between water level monitor, and all of its uncertainties is complex; i.e. it must be ensured
that in any case the error mode is triggered by any corner case where there is no fault (which is not the
case for the given paramters); symbolic simulation assists in parameterization, design, and debugging.
5.3 Discussion
The example above does not show scalability to large problem sizes; this was not the intention. It shows
that an how the approach contributes to scalability towards applicability: first, we can (re-)use existing
models or C-code. Second, it shows that it is useful to solve the problem of analyzing the robustness of
CPS under the presence of uncertainties including discrete faults. This is a domain, where pure numerical
simulation fails as it needs an exponential number of simulation runs.
Lessons learned from the concrete implementation shows that run-times of symbolic simulation runs
very much on details of models; e.g. we used timers that were not necessary (not wrong, but simply
not needed) which doubled the run-time. Leaving modeling issues aside, the operations on AADD are
implemented in an inefficient way and clearly need further research, while the LP problem we identified
significantly contributes to keep over-approximation very little. Interesting would in that context be the
use of a SAT/SMT solver to represent the functional dependabilities while maintaining the LP problem
and the solver at the interface between discrete and continuous components.
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6 Conclusion
We have described the problem of verification of uncertain CPS. As two main results we have introduced
first AADD as a model that allows us compute with uncertainties, independent from a particular model
of computation. Second, we have shown how this allows us to implement a symbolic simulator that is
not strictly bound to a particular model of computation. The following aspects contribute to scalability
towards larger problem sizes and, in particular, application in industrial development flows:
1. The approach to separate computation with uncertainties from simulation using signals and pro-
cesses in different models of computation allows us to bring symbolic simulation easily into pre-
existing frameworks. The re-use of existing models, simulators, and other verification infrastruc-
ture from numerical simulation becomes easier, at least for static models of computation. Currently
we support SystemC and its AMS extensions; in student’s work also Labview has been enabled
for symbolic simulation.
2. The flexibility gained by not being bound to a particular model of computation (e.g. hybrid au-
tomata) makes it easier to formulate models that avoid known issues for scalability. In the model
of the example, we could hence make the following abstractions:
• The implementation of the controller and the sensors is discrete; we have hence chosen an
interface between continuous and discrete parts that uses sampling – this avoids the need to
determine threshold crossing.
• We used the static data flow model of computation (together with continuous-time) for the
overall structure of the model.
3. AADD combine affine arithmetic with (R)OBDD. Both are know to be efficient representations in
the discrete and continuous domain. In particular the proposed use of an LP solver as described in
Sec. 3 significantly reduces over-approximation even for larger numbers (i.e. 1000s) of leaf nodes
(reached states). To foster higher scalability, operations on AADD must be further optimized to
proceed to complex software systems. While (R)OBDD and affine arithmetic are each maybe not
the most efficient representations, they are at least common and well-understood, and vast research
is available to increase efficiency.
6.1 Future work
Currently, we limit the implementation of the symbolic simulation to static MoCs. This is useful as it
allows us the integration of AADD in existing simulators without changing their execution semantics.
However, this limitation is too strict if one would like to check whether deadlocks or race conditions
are due to uncertainties. A first idea to allow symbolic simulation also of dynamic MoCs would be to
integrate a symbol for unionsq for that case; operators on AADD could then do nothing in that case.
We currently only support uncertainties that are modeled by non-deterministic choice of a set or a
range. However, in particular when modeling many possible discrete errors one is also interested in the
probability of a resulting hazard. Ongoing work targets the extension towards probabilistic uncertainties.
We have described a first approach in that direction in [13]. Also, Olbrich’s distribution arithmetic [21]
would be a useful starting point in that context.
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